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Abstract
We investigate the space efficiency of a Propositional Knowledge Representation (PKR)
formalism. Intuitively, the space efficiency of a formalism F in representing a certain piece
of knowledge α, is the size of the shortest formula of F that represents α. In this paper we
assume that knowledge is either a set of propositional interpretations (models) or a set of
propositional formulae (theorems). We provide a formal way of talking about the relative
ability of PKR formalisms to compactly represent a set of models or a set of theorems. We
introduce two new compactness measures, the corresponding classes, and show that the
relative space efficiency of a PKR formalism in representing models/theorems is directly
related to such classes. In particular, we consider formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning,
such as circumscription and default logic, as well as belief revision operators and the stable
model semantics for logic programs with negation. One interesting result is that formalisms
with the same time complexity do not necessarily belong to the same space efficiency class.
1. Introduction
During the last years a large number of formalisms for knowledge representation (KR) have
been proposed in the literature. Such formalisms have been studied from several perspec-
tives, including semantical properties, and computational complexity. Here we investigate
space efficiency, a property that has to do with the minimal size needed to represent a cer-
tain piece of knowledge in a given formalism. This study is motivated by the fact that the
same piece of knowledge can be represented by two formalisms using a different amount of
space. Therefore, all else remaining the same, a formalism could be preferred over another
one because it needs less space to store information.
The definition of space efficiency, however, is not simple. Indeed, a formalism may allow
several different ways to represent the same piece of knowledge. For example, let us assume
that we want to represent the piece of knowledge “today is Monday”. In Propositional
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Logic we may decide to use a single propositional variable monday. The fact that today is
Monday can be represented by the formula monday, but also by the formula ¬¬monday,
as well as monday ∧ (rain ∨ ¬rain), because all formulae of the Propositional Logic that
are logically equivalent to monday represent exactly the same information.
In Propositional Logic, we should consider the shortest of the equivalent formulae used
to represent the information we have. The same principle can be applied to a generic
formalism: if it allows several formulae to represent the same information, then we only take
into account the shortest one. Therefore, we say that the space efficiency of a formalism F
in representing a certain piece of knowledge α is the size of the shortest formula of F that
represents α. Space efficiency —also called succinctness or compactness— of a formalism
is a measure of its ability in representing knowledge in a small amount of space.
In this paper we focus on propositional KR (PKR) formalisms. We do not give a
formal definition of which formalisms are propositional and which one are not: intuitively,
in a propositional formalism, quantifications are not allowed, and thus the formulae are
syntactically bounded to be formed only using propositional connectives, plus some other
kind of nonclassical connectives (for instance, negation in logic programs, etc.).
So far, we have not discussed what knowledge represents. A possible way to think of a
piece of knowledge is that it represents all facts that can be inferred from it. In other words,
knowing something is the same as knowing everything that can be logically implied. The
second way — which is in some cases more natural — is to think of a piece of knowledge
as the set of states of the world that we consider possible.
In a more formal way, we say that knowledge is represented either by a set of proposi-
tional interpretations (those describing states of the world we consider plausible) or a set
of formulae (those implied from what we know). Consequently, we focus on both reasoning
problems of model checking and theorem proving. The following example shows that we
can really think of knowledge in both ways.
Example 1 We want to eat in a fast food, and want to have either a sandwich or a salad
(but not both), and either water or coke (but not both).
In Propositional Logic, each choice can be represented as a model, and the following
models represent all possible choices (models are represented by writing down only the letters
mapped to true).
A = {{sandwich,water}, {sandwich, coke}, {salad,water}, {salad, coke}}
For representing the set of choices we can use formulae instead of models. In this case,
we write down a set of formulae whose models represent exactly the allowed choices, as
follows.
C = (sandwich ∨ salad) ∧ (¬sandwich ∨ ¬salad) ∧ (sandwich → ¬salad) ∧
(water ∨ coke) ∧ (¬water ∨ ¬coke) ∧ (¬coke→ water)
Actually, we can get rid of redundancies, and end up with the following formula.
F = (sandwich ∨ salad) ∧ (¬sandwich ∨ ¬salad) ∧ (water ∨ coke) ∧ (¬water ∨ ¬coke)
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More formally, F represents the set of models A, because for each interpretation I, I ∈ A
holds if and only if I |= F . The formula F also represents the set of formulae C, because
Cn(F ) = Cn(C), where Cn(.) is the function that gives the set of all conclusions that can
be drawn from a propositional formula.
1.1 State of the Art
A question that has been deeply investigated, and is related to space efficiency, is the
possibility of translating a formula expressed in one formalism into a formula expressed in
another formalism (under the assumption, of course, that these formulae represent the same
knowledge).
In most cases, the analysis is about the possibility of translating formulae from different
formalisms to Propositional Logic (PL). For example, Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter (1991, 1994)
proposed a translation from default logic to PL, and a translation from disjunctive logic
programs to PL, while Winslett (1989) introduced a translation from revised knowledge
bases to PL, and Gelfond, Przymusinska, and Przymusinskyi (1989) defined a translation
from circumscription to PL.
All the above translations, as well as many other ones in the literature, lead to an
exponential increase of the size of the formula, in the worst case. When the best known
translation yields a formula in the target formalism which has exponential size w.r.t. the
formula in the source formalism, a natural question arising is whether such exponential
blow up is due to the specific translation, or is intrinsic of the problem. For example,
although all proposed translations from default logic to PL lead to the exponential blow
up, we cannot conclude that all possible translations suffer from this problem: it could be
that a polynomial translation exists, but it has not discovered so far.
Some works have focussed on the question of whether this kind of exponential increase
in the size is intrinsic or not. Cadoli, Donini, and Schaerf (1996) have shown that many in-
teresting fragments of default logic and circumscription cannot be expressed by polynomial-
time fragments of PL without super-polynomially increasing the size of formulae. It has
been proved that such a super-polynomial increase of size is necessary when translating
unrestricted propositional circumscription (Cadoli, Donini, Schaerf, & Silvestri, 1997) and
most operators for belief revision into PL (Cadoli, Donini, Liberatore, & Schaerf, 1999;
Liberatore, 1995).
Gogic and collegues (1995) analyzed the relative succinctness of several PKR formalisms
in representing sets of models. Among other results, they showed that skeptical default logic
can represent sets of models more succinctly than circumscription.
Kautz, Kearns, and Selman (1995) and Khardon and Roth (1996, 1997) considered
representations of knowledge bases based on the notion of characteristic model, comparing
them to other representations, e.g., based on clauses. They showed that the representation of
knowledge bases with their characteristic models is sometimes exponentially more compact
than other ones, and that the converse is true in other cases.
However, all the above results are based on specific proofs, tailored to a specific re-
duction, and do not help us to define equivalence classes for the space efficiency of KR
formalisms. In a recent paper (Cadoli, Donini, Liberatore, & Schaerf, 1996b), a new com-
plexity measure for decision problems, called compilability, has been introduced. In the
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present paper we show how this new measure can be directly used to characterize the space
efficiency of PKR formalisms. We emphasize methodological aspects, expressing in a more
general context many of the results presented before.
1.2 Goal
The notion of polynomial time complexity has a great importance in KR (as well as many
other fields of computer science), as problems that can be solved in polynomial time are to
be considered easy, from a computational point of view.
The notion of polynomial many-one reducibility also has a very intuitive meaning when
applied to KR: if there exists a polynomial many-one reduction from one formalism to
another one, then the time complexity of reasoning in the two formalisms is comparable.
This allows to say, e.g., that inference in PL is coNP-complete, i.e. it is one of the hardest
problems among those in the complexity class coNP.
As a result, we have a formal tool for comparing the difficulty of reasoning in two
formalisms. What is missing is a way for saying that one formalism is able to represent the
same information in less space.
Example 2 We consider again the lunch scenario of the previous example. We show that
we can reduce the size of the representation using circumscription instead of Propositional
Logic. In PL, the knowledge of the previous example was represented by the formula F :
F = (sandwich ∨ salad) ∧ (¬sandwich ∨ ¬salad) ∧ (water ∨ coke) ∧ (¬water ∨ ¬coke)
The set of models of this formula is A, and the models of A are exactly the minimal
models of the formula Fc defined as follows.
Fc = (sandwich ∨ salad) ∧ (water ∨ coke)
By the definition of circumscription (McCarthy, 1980) it holds that F is equivalent to
CIRC(Fc; {sandwich, salad,water, coke}, ∅, ∅). Note that Fc is shorter than F . If this result
can be proved to hold for arbitrary sets of models, we may conclude that circumscription is
more space efficient than Propositional Logic in representing knowledge expressed as sets of
models.
Our goal is to provide a formal way of talking about the relative ability of PKR for-
malisms to compactly represent information, where the information is either a set of models
or a set of theorems. In particular, we would like to be able to say that a specific PKR
formalism provides “one of the most compact ways to represent models/theorems” among
the PKR formalisms of a specific class.
1.3 Results
We introduce two new compactness measures (model and theorem compactness) and the
corresponding classes (model-C and thm-C, where C is a complexity class like P, NP, coNP,
etc.). Such classes form two hierarchies that are isomorphic to the polynomial-time hierarchy
(Stockmeyer, 1976). We show that the relative space efficiency of a PKR formalism is
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directly related to such classes. In particular, the ability of a PKR formalism to compactly
represent sets of models/theorems is directly related to the class of the model/theorem
hierarchy it belongs to. Problems higher up in the model/theorem hierarchy can represent
sets of models/theorems more compactly than formalisms that are in lower classes.
This classification is obtained through a general framework and not by making direct
comparisons and specific translations between the various PKR formalisms. Furthermore,
our approach also allows for a simple and intuitive notion of completeness for both model
and theorem hierarchies. This notion precisely characterizes both the relation between
formalisms at different levels, and the relations between formalisms at the same level. An
interesting result is that two PKR formalisms in which model checking or inference belong
to the same time complexity class may belong to different compactness classes. This may
suggest a criterion for choosing between two PKR formalisms in which reasoning has the
same time complexity—namely, choose the more compact one. Also, two PKR formalisms
may belong to the same theorem compactness class, yet to different model compactness
classes. This stresses the importance of clarifying whether one wants to represent models
or theorems when choosing a PKR formalism.
1.4 Outline
In the next section we introduce the notation and the assumptions that we adopt in this
work. In Section 3 (Compilability) we briefly recall some notions on non-uniform computa-
tion that are important for what follows and we recall the basic definitions of compilability
classes (Cadoli et al., 1996b). In Section 4 (Reductions) we describe the constraints we
impose on reductions, while in Section 5 (Space Efficiency) we introduce our compactness
classes. In Section 6 (Applications) we actually compare many known PKR formalisms
using our framework. Finally, in Section 7 (Related Work and Conclusions) we compare
our work with other proposals presented in the literature and draw some conclusions.
2. Notations and Assumptions
In this section we define what knowledge bases and formalisms are. Since we want to
consider formalisms that are very different both in syntax and in semantics, we need very
general definitions. Let us consider, as a base case, the formalism of propositional calculus.
Formally, we can assume that it is composed of three parts:
1. a syntax, which is used to define the well-formed formulae;
2. a proof theory, which allows for saying when a formula follows from another one; and
3. a model-theoretic semantics, which establishes when a model satisfies a formula.
The syntax is defined from a finite alphabet of propositional symbols L = {a, b, c, . . .},
possibly with subscripts, and the usual set of propositional connectives ∧, ∨, ¬.
In terms of knowledge representation, the proof theory can be seen as a way for extract-
ing knowledge from a knowledge base. For example, if our knowledge base is a∧ c, then the
fact a∨ b holds. We can thus say that the formula a∨ b is part of the knowledge represented
by a ∧ c.
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In some cases, we want knowledge bases to represent models rather than sets of formulas.
An interpretation for an alphabet of propositional variables L is a mapping from L in
{true, false}. The model-theoretic semantics of the propositional calculus is the usual way
of extending an interpretation for L to well-formed formulas.
Let us now extend such definition to generic formalisms: a formalism is composed of a
syntax, a proof theory, and a model-theoretic semantics.
We remark that each formalism has its own syntax: for instance, default logic includes
a ternary connective : for denoting default rules, while logic programming has a special
unary connective not(), and so on. A knowledge base of a formalism F is simply a well-
formed formula, according to the syntax of the formalism.
Each formalism has its own proof theory as well. The proof theory of a formalism F is a
binary relation ⊢F on the set of knowledge bases and formulae. Intuitively, FB ⊢F φ means
that φ is a consequence of the knowledge base KB, according to the rules of the formalism
F . As a result, the set of formulae φ that are implied by a knowledge base KB is exactly
the knowledge represented by KB.
The base of a comparison between two different formalisms is a concept of equivalence,
allowing for saying that two knowledge bases (of two different formalisms) represent the
same piece of knowledge. Since the knowledge represented by a knowledge base is the set
of formulas it implies, we have to assume that the syntax of these formulae is the same
for all formalisms. Namely, we always assume that the formulae implied by a knowledge
base are well-formed formulae of the propositional calculus. In other words, each formalism
has a syntax for the knowledge bases: however, we assume that the proof theory relates
knowledge bases (formulae in the syntax of the formalism) with propositional formulae. So,
while writing KB ⊢F φ, we assume that KB is a knowledge base in the syntax of F , while
φ is a propositional formula.
This allows for saying that two knowledge bases KB1 and KB2, expressed in two dif-
ferent formalisms F1 and F2, represent the same piece of knowledge: this is true when, for
any propositional formula φ it holds KB1 ⊢F1 φ if and only if KB2 ⊢F2 φ.
The model-theoreric semantics of a formalism is a relation |=F between propositional
models and knowledge bases. In this case, we assume a fixed alphabet L, thus the set of
all interpretations is common to all formalisms. When a model M and a knowledge base
KB are in the relation, we write M |=F KB. Intuitively, this means that the model M
supports the piece of knowledge represented by KB.
We remark that some formalisms, e.g. credolous default logic (Reiter, 1980), have a
proof theory, but do not have a model-theoretic semantics. It is also possible to conceive
formalisms with a model-theoretic semantics but no proof theory. When both of them are
defined, we assume that they are related by the following formula:
KB ⊢F φ iff ∀I . I |= KB implies I |= φ
Regarding the proof theory of formalisms, we only consider formulae that are shorter
than the knowledge base, that is, we assume that the knowledge represented by a knowlegde
base KB is the set of formulae φ such that KB ⊢F φ, and the size of φ is at most the size
of KB. This is done for two reasons: first, formulas that are larger than KB are likely to
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contain large parts that are actually independent from KB; second, we can give technicals
result in a very simple way by using the compilability classes introduced in the next section.
Assumption 1 We consider only formulae whose size is less than or equal to that of the
knowledge base.
All formalisms we consider satisfy the right-hand side distruibutivity of conjunction,
that is, KB ⊢F φ ∧ µ if and only if KB ⊢F φ and KB ⊢F µ. The assumption on the size
of φ is not restrictive in this case, if φ is a CNF formula.
3. Compilability Classes
We assume the reader is familiar with basic complexity classes, such as P, NP and (uniform)
classes of the polynomial hierarchy (Stockmeyer, 1976; Garey & Johnson, 1979). Here we
just briefly introduce non-uniform classes (Johnson, 1990). In the sequel, C, C′, etc. denote
arbitrary classes of the polynomial hierarchy.
We assume that the input instances of problems are strings built over an alphabet Σ.
We denote with ǫ the empty string and assume that the alphabet Σ contains a special
symbol # to denote blanks. The length of a string x ∈ Σ∗ is denoted by |x|.
Definition 1 An advice A is a function that takes an integer and returns a string.
Advices are important in complexity theory because definitions and results are often
based on special Turing machines that can determine the result of an oracle “for free”, that
is, in constant time.
Definition 2 An advice-taking Turing machine is a Turing machine enhanced with the
possibility to determine A(|x|) in constant time, where x is the input string.
Of course, the fact that A(|x|) can be determined in constant time (while A can be
an intractable or even undecidable function) makes all definitions based on advice-taking
Turing machine different from the same ones based on regular Turing machine. For example,
an advice-taking Turing machine can calculate in polynomial time many functions that a
regular Turing machine cannot (including some untractable ones).
Note that the advice is only a function of the size of the input, not of the input itself.
Hence, advice-taking Turing machines are closely related to non-uniform families of circuits
(Boppana & Sipser, 1990). Clearly, if the advice were allowed to access the whole instance,
it would be able to determine the solution of any problem in constant time.
Definition 3 An advice-taking Turing machine uses polynomial advice if there exists a
polynomial p such that the advice oracle A satisfies |A(n)| ≤ p(n) for any nonnegative
integers n.
The non-uniform complexity classes are based on advice-taking Turing machines. In
this paper we consider a simplified definition, based on classes of the polynomial hierarchy.
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Definition 4 If C is a class of the polynomial hierarchy, then C/poly is the class of lan-
guages defined by Turing machines with the same time bounds as C, augmented by polyno-
mial advice.
Any class C/poly is also known as non-uniform C, where non-uniformity is due to the
presence of the advice. Non-uniform and uniform complexity classes are related: Karp and
Lipton (1980) proved that if NP ⊆ P/poly then Πp2 = Σ
p
2 = PH, i.e., the polynomial hier-
archy collapses at the second level, while Yap (1983) generalized their results, in particular
by showing that if NP ⊆ coNP/poly then Πp3 = Σ
p
3 = PH, i.e., the polynomial hierarchy
collapses at the third level. An inprovement of this results has been given by Ko¨bler and
Watanabe (1998): they proved that Πpk ⊆ Σ
p
k/poly implies that the polynomial hierar-
chy collapses to ZPP(Σpk+1). The collapse of the polynomial hierarchy is considered very
unlikely by most researchers in structural complexity.
We now summarize some definitions and results proposed to formalize the compilability
of problems (Cadoli et al., 1996b), adapting them to the context and terminology of PKR
formalisms. We remark that it is not the aim of this paper to give a formalization of
compilability of problems, or to analyze problems from this point of view. Rather, we show
how to use the compilability classes as a technical tool for proving results on the relative
efficiency of formalisms in representing knowledge in little space.
Several papers in the literature focus on the problem of reducing the complexity of
problems via a preprocessing phase (Kautz & Selman, 1992; Kautz et al., 1995; Khardon
& Roth, 1997). This motivates the introduction of a measure of complexity of problems
assuming that such preprocessing is allowed. Following the intuition that a knowledge base
is known well before questions are posed to it, we divide a reasoning problem into two parts:
one part is fixed or accessible off-line (the knowledge base), and the second one is varying, or
accessible on-line (the interpretation/formula). Compilability aims at capturing the on-line
complexity of solving a problem composed of such inputs, i.e., complexity with respect to
the second input when the first one can be preprocessed in an arbitrary way. In the next
section we show the close connection between compilability and the space efficiency of PKR
formalisms.
A function f is called poly-size if there exists a polynomial p such that for all strings
x it holds |f(x)| ≤ p(|x|). An exception to this definition is when x represents a number:
in this case, we impose |f(x)| ≤ p(x). As a result, we can say that the function A used in
advice-taking turing machine is a polysize function.
A function g is called poly-time if there exists a polynomial q such that for all x, g(x)
can be computed in time less than or equal to q(|x|). These definitions easily extend to
binary functions as usual.
We define a language of pairs S as a subset of Σ∗ × Σ∗. This is necessary to represent
the two inputs to a PKR reasoning problem, i.e., the knowledge base (KB), and the formula
or interpretation. As an example, the problem of Inference in Propositional Logic (pli) is
defined as follows.
pli = {〈x, y〉 | x is a set of propositional formulae (the KB), y is a formula, and x ⊢ y}
It is well known that pli is coNP-complete, i.e., it is one of the “hardest” problems
among those belonging to coNP. Our goal is to prove that pli is the “hardest” theorem-
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proving problem among those in coNP that can be solved by preprocessing the first input
in an arbitrary way, i.e., the KB. To this end, we introduce a new hierarchy of classes, the
non-uniform compilability classes, denoted as ‖❀C, where C is a generic uniform complexity
class, such as P, NP, coNP, or Σp2.
Definition 5 (‖❀C classes) A language of pairs S ⊆ Σ∗ × Σ∗ belongs to ‖❀C iff there
exists a binary poly-size function f and a language of pairs S′ ∈ C such that for all 〈x, y〉 ∈ S
it holds:
〈f(x, |y|), y〉 ∈ S′ iff 〈x, y〉 ∈ S
Notice that the poly-size function f takes as input both x (the KB) and the size of y
(either the formula or the interpretation). This is done for technical reason, that is, such
assumption allows obtaining results that are impossible to prove if the function f only
takes x as input (Cadoli et al., 1996b). Such assuption is useful for proving negative results,
that is, theorems of impossibility of compilation: indeed, if it is impossible to reduce the
complexity of a problem using a function that takes both x and |y| as input, then such
reduction is also impossible using a function taking x only as its argument.
Theorem 1 (Cadoli, Donini, Liberatore, & Schaerf, 1997, Theorem 6) Let C be
a class in the polynomial hierarchy and S ⊆ Σ∗ × Σ∗. A problem S belongs to ‖❀C if
and only if there exists a poly-size function f and a language of pairs S′, such that for all
〈x, y〉 ∈ Σ∗ × Σ∗ it holds that:
1. for all y such that |y| ≤ k, 〈f(x, k), y〉 ∈ S′ if and only if 〈x, y〉 ∈ S;
2. S′ ∈ C.
Clearly, any problem whose time complexity is in C is also in ‖❀C: just take f(x, |y|) = x
and S′ = S. What is interesting is that some problem in C may belong to ‖❀C′ with
C′ ⊂ C, e.g.,, some problems in NP are in ‖❀P. This is true for example for some problems
in belief revision (Cadoli et al., 1999). In the rest of this paper, however, we mainly focus
on “complete” problems, defined below. A pictorial representation of the class ‖❀C is in
Figure 1, where we assume that S′ ∈ C.
For the problem pli no method proving that it belongs to ‖❀P is known. In order
to show that it (probably) does not belong to ‖❀P, we define a notion of reduction and
completeness.
Definition 6 (Non-uniform comp-reducibility) Given two problems A and B, A is
non-uniformly comp-reducible to B (denoted as A ≤nu−comp B) iff there exist two poly-size
binary functions f1 and f2, and a polynomial-time binary function g such that for every
pair 〈x, y〉 it holds that 〈x, y〉 ∈ A if and only if 〈f1(x, |y|), g(f2(x, |y|), y)〉 ∈ B.
The ≤nu−comp reductions can be represented as depicted in Figure 2. Such reductions
satisfy all important properties of a reduction.
Theorem 2 (Cadoli et al., 1996b, Theorem 5) The reductions ≤nu−comp satisfy tran-
sitivity and are compatible (Johnson, 1990) with the class ‖❀C for every complexity class C.
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|y|✦
✦✦✶
✲
| |
y ✲
〈x, y〉 ∈ S
x
S′
f
✲
✲
✻
Figure 1: A representation of ‖❀C.
|y|
✲
✲
✻
| |
y′
❄
✲
f2
y ✲
x′x
g
f1
✲
✲
✲
Figure 2: The nu-comp-C reductions.
Therefore, it is possible to define the notions of hardness and completeness for ‖❀C for
every complexity class C.
Definition 7 (‖❀C-completeness) Let S be a language of pairs and C a complexity class.
S is ‖❀C-hard iff for all problems A ∈ ‖❀C we have that A ≤nu−comp S. Moreover, S is
‖❀C-complete if S is in ‖❀C and is ‖❀C-hard.
We now have the right complexity class to completely characterize the problem pli. In
fact pli is ‖❀coNP-complete (Cadoli et al., 1996b, Theorem 7). Furthermore, the hierarchy
formed by the compilability classes is proper if and only if the polynomial hierarchy is
proper (Cadoli et al., 1996b; Karp & Lipton, 1980; Yap, 1983) — a fact widely conjectured
to be true.
Informally, we may say that ‖❀NP-hard problems are “not compilable to P”, as from
the above considerations we know that if there exists a preprocessing of their fixed part that
makes them on-line solvable in polynomial time, then the polynomial hierarchy collapses.
The same holds for ‖❀coNP-hard problems. In general, a problem which is ‖❀C-complete
for a class C can be regarded as the “toughest” problem in C, even after arbitrary prepro-
cessing of the fixed part. On the other hand, a problem in ‖❀C is a problem that, after
preprocessing of the fixed part, becomes a problem in C (i.e., it is “compilable to C”).
We close the section by giving another example of use of the compilability classes through
the well-known formalism of Circumscription (McCarthy, 1980). Let x be any propositional
formula. The minimal models of x are the truth assignments satisfying x having as few
positive values as possible (w.r.t. set containment). The problem we consider is: check
whether a given model is a minimal model of a propositional formula. This problem, called
Minimal Model checking (mmc), can be reformulated as the problem of model checking in
Circumscription, which is known to be co-NP-complete (Cadoli, 1992).
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If we consider the knowledge base x as given off-line, and the truth assignment y as
given on-line, we obtain the following definition:
mmc = {〈x, y〉 | y is a minimal model of x }
This problem can be shown to be ‖❀coNP-complete (Cadoli et al., 1996b, Theorem 13).
Hence, it is very unlikely that it can be in ‖❀P; that is, it is very unlikely that there exists
some off-line processing of the knowledge base, yielding (say) some data structure x′, such
that given y, it can now checked in polynomial time whether y is a minimal model of x.
This, of course, unless x′ has exponential size. This observation applies also when x′ is a
knowledge base in Propositional Logic, and led to the interpretation that Circumscription
is more compact, or succint, than PL (Cadoli, Donini, & Schaerf, 1995; Gogic et al., 1995).
Our framework allows to generalize these results for all PKR formalisms, as shown in the
sequel.
4. Reductions among KR Formalisms
We now define the forms of reduction between PKR formalisms that we analyze in the
following sections. A formula can always be represented as a string over an alphabet Σ,
hence from now on we consider translations as functions transforming strings.
Let F1 and F2 be two PKR formalisms. There exists a poly-size reduction from F1 to
F2, denoted as f : F1 7→ F2, if f is a poly-size function such that for any given knowledge
base KB in F1, f(KB) is a knowledge base in F2. Clearly, reductions should be restricted
to produce a meaningful output. In particular, we now discuss reductions that preserve the
models of the original theory.
The semantic approach by Gogic and collegues (1995) is that the models of the two
knowledge bases must be exactly the same. In other words, if a knowledge base KB of the
formalism F1 is translated into a knowledge baseKB
′ of the formalism F2, thenM |=F1 KB
if and only if M |=F2 KB
′. This approach can be summarized by: a reduction between
formalisms F1 and F2 is a way to translate knowledge bases of F1 into knowledge bases of F2,
preserving their sets of models. While this semantics is intuitively grounded, it is very easy
to show examples in which two formalisms that we consider equally space-efficient cannot be
translated to each other. Let us consider for instance a variant of the propositional calculus
in which the syntax is that formulas must be of the form x1 ∧ F , where F is a regular
formula over the variables x2, . . .. Clearly, this formalism is able to represent knowledge
in the same space than the propositional calculus (apart a polynomial factor). However,
according to the definition, this formalism cannot be translated to propositional calculus:
there is no knowledge base that is equivalent to KB = ¬x1. Indeed, the only model of
KB is ∅, while any model of any consistent knowledge base of the modified propositional
calculus contains x1.
We propose a more general approach that can deal also with functions f that change
the language of the KB. To this end, we allow for a translation gKB from models of KB to
models of f(KB). We stress that, to be as general as possible, the translation may depend
on KB — i.e., different knowledge bases may have different translations of their models.
We want this translation easy to compute, since otherwise the computation of gKB could
hide the complexity of reasoning in the formalism. However, observe that to this end, it is
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not sufficient to impose that gKB is computable in polynomial time. In fact, once KB is
fixed, its models could be trivially translated to models of f(KB) in constant time, using
a lookup table. This table would be exponentially large, though; and this is what we want
to forbid. Hence, we impose that gKB is a circuit of polynomial-size wrt KB. We still use
a functional notation gKB(M) to denote the result of applying a model M to the circuit
gKB. A formal definition follows.
Definition 8 (Model Preservation) A poly-size reduction f : F1 7→ F2 satisfies model-
preservation if there exists a polynomial p such that, for each knowledge base KB in F1 there
exists a circuit gKB whose size is bounded by p(|KB|), and such that for every interpretation
M of the variables of KB it holds that M |=F1 KB iff gKB(M) |=F2 f(KB).
The rationale of model-preserving reduction is that the knowledge base KB of the first
formalism F1 can be converted into a knowledge base f(KB) in the second one F2, and this
reduction should be such that each model M in F1 can be easily translated into a model
gKB(M) in F2.
We require g to depend on KB, because the transformation f , in general, could take
the actual form of KB into account. This happens in the following example of a model-
preserving translation.
Example 3 We reduce a fragment of skeptical default logic (Kautz & Selman, 1991) to
circumscription with varying letters, using the transformation introduced by Etherington
(1987). Let 〈D,W 〉 be a prerequisite-free normal (PFN) default theory, i.e., all defaults
are of the form :γ
γ
, where γ is a generic formula. Let Z be the set of letters occurring in
〈D,W 〉. Define PD as the set of letters {aγ |
:γ
γ
∈ D}. The function f can be defined in
the following way: f(〈D,W 〉) = CIRC(T ;PD;Z), where T = W ∪ {aγ ≡ ¬γ|aγ ∈ PD},
PD are the letters to be minimized, and Z (the set of letters occurring in 〈D,W 〉) are
varying letters. We show that f is a model-preserving poly-size reduction. In fact, given
a set of PFN defaults D let gD be a function such that for each interpretation M for Z,
gD(M) = M ∪ {aγ ∈ PD|M |= ¬γ}. Clearly, f is poly-size, gD can be realized by a circuit
whose size is polynomial in |D|, and M is a model of at least one extension of 〈D,W 〉 iff
gD(M) |= CIRC(T ;PD;Z). The dependence of g only on D stresses the fact that, in this
case, the circuit g does not depend on the whole knowledge base 〈D,W 〉, but just on D.
Clearly, when models are preserved, theorems are preserved as well. A weaker form of
reduction is the following one, where only theorems are preserved. Also in this case we
allow theorems of KB to be translated by a “simple” circuit gKB to theorems of KB.
Definition 9 (Theorem Preservation) A poly-size reduction f : F1 7→ F2 satisfies theorem-
preservation if there exists a polynomial p such that, for each knowledge base KB in F1,
there exists a circuit gKB whose size is bounded by p(|KB|), and such that for every formula
ϕ on the variables of KB, it holds that KB ⊢F1 ϕ iff f(KB) ⊢F2 gKB(ϕ).
The theorem-preserving reduction has a property similar to that of the model-preserving
reduction, when the knowledge bases are used to represent theorems rather than models.
Namely, a knowledge base KB is translated into another knowledge base f(KB) which can
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be used to represent the same set of theorems. More precisely, we have that each theorem
ϕ of KB is represented by a theorem gKB(ϕ) of f(KB).
Winslett (1989) has shown an example of a reduction from updated knowledge bases to
PL that is theorem-preserving but not model-preserving. Using Winslett’s reduction, one
could use the same machinery for propositional reasoning in the KB, both before and after
the update (plus the reduction). Also the reduction shown in the previous Example 3 is
theorem-preserving, this time g being the identity circuit.
We remark that our definitions of reduction are more general than those proposed by
Gogic and collegues (1995). In fact, these authors consider only a notion analogous to
Definition 8. and only for the case when g is the identity — i.e., models in the two formalisms
should be identical. By allowing a simple translation g between models Definition 8 covers
more general forms of reductions preserving models, like the one of Example 3.
5. Comparing the Space Efficiency of PKR Formalisms
In this section we show how to use the compilability classes defined in Section 3 to compare
the succinctness of PKR formalisms.
Let F1 and F2 be two formalisms representing sets of models. We prove that any
knowledge base α in F1 can be reduced, via a poly-size reduction, to a knowledge base β
in F2 satisfying model-preservation if and only if the compilability class of the problem of
model checking (first input: KB, second input: interpretation) in F2 is higher than or equal
to the compilability class of the problem of model checking in F1.
Similarly, we prove that theorem-preserving poly-size reductions exist if and only if the
compilability class of the problem of inference (first input: KB, second input: formula, cf.
definition of the problem pli) in F1 is higher than or equal to the compilability class of the
problem of inference in F2.
In order to simplify the presentation and proof of the theorems we introduce some
definitions.
Definition 10 (Model hardness/completeness) Let F be a PKR formalism and C be
a complexity class. If the problem of model checking for F belongs to the compilability class
‖❀C, where the model is the varying part of the instances, we say that F is in model-C.
Similarly, if model checking is ‖❀C-complete (hard), we say that F is model-C-complete
(hard).
Definition 11 (Theorem hardness/completeness) Let F be a PKR formalism and
C be a complexity class. If the problem of inference for the formalism F belongs to the
compilability class ‖❀C, whenever the formula is the varying part of the instance, we say
that F is in thm-C. Similarly, if inference is ‖❀C-complete (hard), we say that F is thm-
C-complete (hard).
These definitions implicitly define two hierarchies, which parallel the polynomial hierar-
chy (Stockmeyer, 1976): the model hierarchy (model-P,model-NP,model-Σp2,etc.) and the
theorem hierarchy (thm-P,thm-NP,thm-Σp2,etc.). The higher a formalism is in the model
hierarchy, the more its efficiency in representing models is — and analogously for theorems.
As an example (Cadoli et al., 1996, Thm. 6), we characterize model and theorem classes of
Propositional Logic.
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Theorem 3 PL is in model-P and it is thm-coNP-complete.
We can now formally establish the connection between succinctness of representations
and compilability classes. In the following theorems, the complexity classes C, C1, C2 belong
to the polynomial hierarchy (Stockmeyer, 1976). In Theorems 5 and 7 we assume that the
polynomial hierarchy does not collapse.
We start by showing that the existence of model-preserving reductions from a formalism
to another one can be easily obtained if their levels in the model hierarchy satisfy a simple
condition.
Theorem 4 Let F1 and F2 be two PKR formalisms. If F1 is in model-C and F2 is model-
C-hard, then there exists a poly-size reduction f : F1 7→ F2 satisfying model preservation.
Proof. Recall that since F1 is in model-C, model checking in F1 is in ‖❀C, and since F2 is
model-C-hard, model checking in F1 is non-uniformly comp-reducible to model checking in
F2. That is, (adapting Def. 6) there exist two poly-size binary functions f1 and f2, and a
polynomial-time binary function g such that for every pair 〈KB,M〉 it holds that
M |=F1 KB if and only if g(f2(KB, |M |),M) |=F2 f1(KB, |M |)
(note that g is the poly-time function appearing in Def. 6, different from gKB which is the
poly-size circuit appearing in Def. 8).
Now observe that |M | can be computed from KB by simply counting the letters appear-
ing in KB; let f3 be such a counting function, i.e., |M | = f3(KB). Clearly, f3 is poly-size.
Define the reduction f as f(KB) = f1(KB, f3(KB)). Since poly-size functions are closed
under composition, f is poly-size. Now we show that f is a model-preserving reduction. By
Definition 8, we need to prove that there exists a polynomial p such that for each knowledge
base KB in F1, there exists a poly-size circuit gKB such that for every interpretation M of
the variables of KB it holds that M |=F1 KB iff gKB(M) |=F2 f(KB).
We proceed as follows: Given aKB in F1, we compute z = f2(KB, |M |) = f2(KB, f3(KB)).
Since f2 and f3 are poly-size, z has size polynomial with respect to |KB|. Define the circuit
gKB(M) as the one computing g(z,M) = g(f2(KB, f3(KB)),M). Since g is a poly-time
function over both inputs, and z is poly-size in KB, there exists a representation of g(z,M)
as a circuit gKB whose size is polynomial wrt KB. From this construction, M |=F1 KB iff
gKB(M) |=F2 f(KB). Hence, the thesis follows.
The following theorem, instead, gives a simple method to prove that there is no model-
preserving reduction from one formalism to another one.
Theorem 5 Let F1 and F2 be two PKR formalisms. If the polynomial hierarchy does not
collapse, F1 is model-C1-hard, F2 is in model-C2, and C2 ⊂ C1, then there is no poly-size
reduction f : F1 7→ F2 satisfying model preservation.
Proof. We show that if such a reduction exists, then C1/poly ⊆ C2/poly which implies that
the polynomial hierarchy collapses at some level (Yap, 1983). Let A be a complete problem
for class C1 — e.g., if C1 is Σ
p
3 then A may be validity of ∃∀∃-quantified boolean formulae
(Stockmeyer, 1976). Define the problem ǫA as follows.
ǫA = {〈x, y〉 | x = ǫ (the empty string) and y ∈ A}
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We already proved (Cadoli et al., 1996b, Thm. 6) that ǫA is ‖❀C1-complete. Since model
checking in F1 is model-C1-hard, ǫA is non-uniformly comp-reducible to model checking in
F1. That is, (adapting Def. 6) there exist two poly-size binary functions f1 and f2, and
a polynomial-time binary function g such that for every pair 〈ǫ, y〉, it holds 〈ǫ, y〉 ∈ ǫA if
and only if g(f2(ǫ, |y|), y) |=F1 f1(ǫ, |y|). Let |y| = n. Clearly, the knowledge base f1(ǫ, |y|)
depends only on n, i.e., there is exactly one knowledge base for each integer. Call it KBn.
Moreover, f2(ǫ, |y|) = f2(ǫ, n) also depends on n only: call it On (for Oracle). Observe that
both KBn and On have polynomial size with respect to n.
If there exists a poly-size reduction f : F1 7→ F2 satisfying model preservation, then given
the knowledge base KBn there exists a poly-size circuit hn such that g(On, y) |=F1 KBn if
and only if hn(g(On, y)) |=F2 f(KBn).
Therefore, the ‖❀C1-complete problem ǫA can be non-uniformly reduced to a problem
in ‖❀C2 as follows: Given y, from its size |y| = n one obtains (with a preprocessing)
f(KBn) and On. Then one checks whether the interpretation hn(g(On, y)) (computable in
polynomial time given n, y and On) is a model in F2 for f(KBn). From the fact that model
checking in F2 is in ‖❀C2, we have that ‖❀C1 ⊆ ‖❀C2. We proved in a previous paper
that such result implies that C1/poly ⊆ C2/poly (Cadoli et al., 1996b, Thm. 9), which in
turns implies that the polynomial hierarchy collapses (Yap, 1983).
The above theorems show that the hierarchy of classes model-C exactly characterizes
the space efficiency of a formalism in representing sets of models. In fact, two formalisms
at the same level in the model hierarchy can be reduced into each other via a poly-size
reduction (Theorem 4), while there is no poly-size reduction from a formalism (F1) higher
up in the hierarchy into one (F2) in a lower class (Theorem 5). In the latter case we say
that F1 is more space-efficient than F2.
Analogous results (with similar proofs) hold for poly-size reductions preserving theorems.
Namely, the next theorem shows how to infer the existence of theorem-preserving reductions,
while the other one gives a way to prove that there is no theorem-preserving reduction from
one formalism to another one.
Theorem 6 Let F1 and F2 be two PKR formalisms. If F1 is in thm-C and F2 is thm-C-
hard, then there exists a poly-size reduction f : F1 7→ F2 satisfying theorem preservation.
Proof. Recall that since F1 is in thm-C, inference in F1 is in ‖❀C, and since F2 is thm-C-
hard, inference in F1 is non-uniformly comp-reducible to inference in F2. That is, (adapting
Def. 6) there exist two poly-size binary functions f1 and f2, and a polynomial-time binary
function g1 such that for every pair 〈KB,ϕ〉 it holds that
KB ⊢F1 ϕ if and only if f1(KB, |ϕ|) ⊢F2 g(f2(KB, |ϕ|), ϕ)
(here we distinguish the poly-time function g appearing in Def. 6 and the poly-size circuit
gKB appearing in Def. 9).
Using Theorem 1 we can replace |ϕ| with an upper bound in the above formula. From
Assumption 1, we know that the size of ϕ is less than or equal to the size of KB; therefore
we replace |ϕ| with |KB|. The above formula now becomes
KB ⊢F1 ϕ if and only if f1(KB, |KB|) ⊢F2 g(f2(KB, |KB|), ϕ)
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Define the reduction f as f(KB) = f1(KB, f3(KB)), where f3 is the poly-size function
that computes the size of its input. Since poly-size functions are closed under composition,
f is poly-size.
Now, we show that f is a theorem-preserving reduction, i.e.,f satisfies Def. 9. This
amounts to proving that for each knowledge base KB in F1 there exists a circuit gKB,
whose size is poynomial wrt KB, such that for every formula ϕ on the variables of KB it
holds that KB ⊢F1 ϕ iff f(KB) ⊢F2 gKB(ϕ).
We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 4: Given a KB in F1, let z = f2(KB, f3(KB)).
Since f2 and f3 are poly-size, z has polynomial size with respect to |KB|. Define gKB(ϕ) =
g(z, ϕ) = g(f2(KB, f3(KB)), ϕ). Clearly, gKB can be represented by a circuit of polynomial
size wrt KB. From this construction, KB ⊢F1 ϕ iff f(KB) ⊢F2 gKB(ϕ). Hence, the claim
follows.
Theorem 7 Let F1 and F2 be two PKR formalisms. If the polynomial hierarchy does not
collapse, F1 is thm-C1-hard, F2 is in thm-C2, and C2 ⊂ C1, then there is no poly-size
reduction f : F1 7→ F2 satisfying theorem preservation.
Proof. We show that if such a reduction exists, then C1/poly ⊆ C2/poly and the polynomial
hierarchy collapses at some level (Yap, 1983). Let A be a complete problem for class C1.
Define the problem ǫA as in the proof of Theorem 5: this problem is ‖❀C1-complete (Cadoli
et al., 1996b, Thm. 6). Since inference in F1 is thm-C1-hard, ǫA is non-uniformly comp-
reducible to inference in F1. That is, (adapting Def. 6) there exist two poly-size binary
functions f1 and f2, and a polynomial-time binary function g such that for every pair 〈ǫ, y〉,
〈ǫ, y〉 ∈ ǫA if and only if f1(ǫ, |y|) ⊢F1 g(f2(ǫ, |y|), y). Let |y| = n. Clearly, the knowledge
base f1(ǫ, |y|) depends just on n, i.e., there is one knowledge base for each integer. Call
it KBn. Moreover, also f2(ǫ, |y|) = f2(ǫ, n) depends just on n: call it On (for Oracle).
Observe that both KBn and On have polynomial size with respect to n.
If there exists a poly-size reduction f : F1 7→ F2 satisfying theorem preservation, then
given the knowledge base KBn there exists a poly-time function hn such that KBn ⊢F1
g(On, y) if and only if f(KBn) ⊢F2 hn(g(On, y)).
Therefore, the ‖❀C1-complete problem ǫA can be non-uniformly reduced to a problem in
‖❀C2 as follows: Given y, from its size |y| = n one obtains (with an arbitrary preprocessing)
f(KBn) and On. Then one checks whether the formula hn(g(On, y)) (computable in poly-
time given y and On) is a theorem in F2 of f(KBn). From the fact that inference in F2 is
in ‖❀C2, we have that ‖❀C1 ⊆ ‖❀C2. It follows that C1/poly ⊆ C2/poly (Cadoli et al.,
1996b, Thm. 9), which implies that the polynomial hierarchy collapses (Yap, 1983).
Theorems 4-7 show that compilability classes characterize very precisely the relative
capability of PKR formalisms to represent sets of models or sets of theorems. For example,
as a consequence of Theorems 3 and 7 there is no poly-size reduction from PL to the
syntactic restriction of PL allowing only Horn clauses that preserves the theorems, unless
the polynomial hierarchy collapses. Kautz and Selman (1992) proved non-existence of such
a reduction for a problem strictly related to pli using a specific proof.
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6. Applications
This section is devoted to the application of the theorems presented in the previous section.
Using Theorems 4-7 and results previously known from the literature, we are able to asses
model- and theorem-compactness of some PKR formalisms.
We assume that definitions of Propositional Logic, default logic (Reiter, 1980), and
circumscription (McCarthy, 1980) are known. Definitions of WIDTIO, SBR, GCWA, and
stable model semantics are in the appropriate subsections.
In the following proofs we refer to the problem ∃∀3QBF, that is, the problem of verifying
whether a quantified Boolean formula ∃X∀Y.¬F is valid, where X and Y are disjoint sets of
variables, and F is a set of clauses on the alphabet X ∪ Y , each composed of three literals.
As an example, a simple formula belonging to this class is: ∃x1, x2∀y1, y2 ¬((x1 ∨ y2) ∧
(¬x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ ¬y1) ∧ (¬y1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ ¬y2) ∧ (¬x1 ∨ ¬x2)).
The problem of deciding validity of a ∃∀3QBF is complete for the class Σp2. As a conse-
quence, the corresponding problem ∗∃∀3QBF, that is deciding whether an input composed
of any string (∗) as the fixed part and a quantified Boolean formula ∃X∀Y.¬F as the varying
one, is complete for the class ‖❀Σp2 (Liberatore, 1998). Notice that in most of the hardness
proofs we show in the sequel we use problems without any meaningful fixed part.
6.1 Stable Model Semantics
Stable model semantics (SM) was introduced by Gelfond and Lifschitz (1988) as a tool to
provide a semantics for logic programs with negation. their original proposal is now one
of the standard semantics for logic programs. We now recall the definition of propositional
stable model.
Let P be a propositional, general logic program. Let M be a subset (i.e., an interpreta-
tion) of the atoms of P . Let PM be the program obtained from P in the following way: if a
clause C of P contains in its body a negated atom ¬A such that A ∈M then C is deleted;
if a body of a clause contains a negated atom ¬A such that A 6∈M then ¬A is deleted from
the body of the clause. If M is a least Herbrand model of PM then M is a stable model of
P .
For the formalism sm, we consider the program P as the knowledge base. We write
P |=sm Q to denote that query Q is implied by a logic program P under Stable Model
semantics.
In order to prove our result, we need to define the kernel of a graph.
Definition 12 (Kernel) Let G = (V,E) be a graph. A kernel of G is a set K ⊆ V such
that, denoting H = V −K, it holds:
1. H is a vertex cover of G
2. for all j ∈ H, there exists an i ∈ K such that (i, j) ∈ E.
We can now state the theorem on the compilability class of inference in the stable model
semantics, and the corresponding theorem compactness class.
Theorem 8 The problem of inference for the Stable Model semantics is ‖❀coNP-complete,
thus Stable Model Semantics is thm-coNPcomplete.
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Proof. Membership in the class follows from the fact that the problem is coNP-complete
(Marek & Truszczyn´ski, 1991). For the hardness, we adapt the proof of Marek and
Truszczyn´ski (1991) showing that deciding whether a query is true in all stable models
is coNP-hard.
Let ǫkernel be the language {ǫ,G} such that G is a graph with at least one kernel.
Let |G| = n, and observe that G cannot have more vertices than its size n.
We show that for each n, there exists a logic program Pn such that for every graph G
with at most n vertices, there exists a query QG such that G has a kernel iff Pn 6|=sm QG.
Let the alphabet of Pn be composed by the following 2n
2 + n propositional letters:
{ai|i ∈ {1..n} } ∪ {rij , sij|i, j ∈ {1..n} }.
The program Pn is defined as:
aj :− ¬ai, rij
sij :− ¬rij
rij :− ¬sij

 for i, j ∈ {1..n}
Given a graph G = (V,E), the query QG is defined as
QG = (
∨
(i,j)∈E
¬rij) ∨ (
∨
(i,j)6∈E
rij)
The reduction from ǫkernel to sm is defined as: f1(x, n) = Pn, i.e., f1 depends only on
its second argument, f2(x, n) = ǫ, i.e., f2 is a constant function, and g = Qy, i.e., given a
graph G, the circuit g computes the query QG.
As a result, this is a ‖❀ reduction. We now show that this reduction is correct, i.e.,
〈ǫ,G〉 ∈ ǫkernel (G has a kernel) iff Pn 6|=SM QG.
If-part. Suppose Pn 6|=SM QG. Then, there exists a stable model M of Pn such that
M |= ¬QG. Observe that ¬QG is equivalent to the conjunction of all rij such that (i, j) ∈ E,
and all ¬rij such that (i, j) 6∈ E. Simplifying Pn with ¬QG we obtain the clauses:
aj :− ¬ai, for (i, j) ∈ E (1)
Observe that M contains all sij such that (i, j) 6∈ E, and in order to be stable, — i.e., to
support atoms rij such that (i, j) ∈ E — M contains no atom sij such that (i, j) ∈ E.
Let H = {j|aj ∈ M}, K = {i|ai 6∈ M}. Now H is a vertex cover of G, since for each
edge (i, j) ∈ E, M should satisfy the corresponding clause (1) aj :− ¬ai, hence either
ai ∈ M , or aj ∈ M . Moreover, for each j in H, the atom aj is in M , and since M is a
stable model, there exists a clause aj :− ¬ai such that ai 6∈M , that is, i ∈ K. Therefore,
K is a kernel of G.
Only-if part. Suppose G = (V,E) has a kernel K, and let H = V −K. Let M be the
interpretation
M = {rij |(i, j) ∈ E} ∪ {sij |(i, j) 6∈ E} ∪ {aj |j ∈ H}
Obviously, M 6|= QG. We now show that M is a stable model of Pn, i.e., M is a least
Herbrand model of PMn . In fact, P
M
n contains the following clauses:
sij for (i, j) 6∈ E (2)
rij for (i, j) ∈ E (3)
aj :− rij for i ∈ K (4)
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Clauses in the last line are obtained from clauses in Pn of the form aj :− ¬ai, rij , where the
clauses such that i ∈ H (hence ai ∈M) are deleted, while in the other clauses the negated
atom ¬ai is deleted, since i ∈ K, hence ai 6∈M . Now for each aj ∈M , the vertex j is in H,
hence there is an edge (i, j) ∈ E, and i ∈ K. Hence clauses (4) and (3) are in PMn , hence in
the least Herbrand model of PMn there are exactly all aj such that j ∈ H.
6.2 Minimal Model Reasoning
One of the most successful form of non-monotonic reasoning is based on the selection of
minimal models. Among the various formalisms based on minimal model semantics we con-
sider here Circumscription (McCarthy, 1980) and the Generalized Closed World Assumption
(GCWA) (Minker, 1982), which is a formalism to represent knowledge in a closed world.
We assume that the reader is familiar with Circumscription, we briefly present the
definition of GCWA. The model semantics for GCWA is defined as (a is a letter):
M |=GCWA KB iff M |= KB∪{¬a | for any positive clause γ, if KB 6⊢ γ then KB 6⊢ γ ∨ a}
We can now present the results for these two formalisms.
Theorem 9 The problem of model checking for Circumscription is ‖❀coNP-complete, thus
Circumscription is model-coNP-complete.
This result is a trivial corollary of a theorem already proved (Cadoli et al., 1997, The-
orem 6). In fact, that proof implicitly shows that model checking for circumscription is
‖❀coNP-complete.
Theorem 10 The problem of model checking for GCWA is in ‖❀P, thus GCWA is in
model-P.
Proof. As already pointed out (Cadoli et al., 1997), it is possible to rewrite GCWA(T )
into a propositional formula F such that, for any given model M , M |= GCWA(T ) if and
only if M |= F . Moreover, the size of F is polynomially bounded by the size of T . As a
consequence, the model compactness for GCWA is in the same class of PL. By Theorem 3
the thesis follows.
Theorem 11 The problem of inference for Circumscription is ‖❀Πp2-complete, thus Cir-
cumscription is thm-Πp2-complete.
This result is a trivial corollary of a theorem published in a previous paper (Cadoli
et al., 1997, Theorem 7) which implicitly shows that inference for circumscription is ‖❀Πp2-
complete.
Theorem 12 The problem of inference for GCWA is ‖❀coNP-complete, thus GCWA is
thm-coNP-complete.
Proof. As already pointed out in the proof of Theorem 10, it is possible to rewrite
GCWA(T ) into a formula F that is equivalent to it. As a consequence, a formula α is
a theorem of GCWA(T ) if and only if it is a theorem of F . Thus, GCWA has at most the
theorem compexity of PL. Since GCWA is a generalization of PL, it follows that GCWA is
in the same theorem compactness class of PL. Hence, GCWA is thm-coNP-complete.
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6.3 Default Logic
In this subsection we present the results for default logic, in its two variants (credulous
and skeptical). For more details on these two main variants of default logic, we refer the
reader to the paper by Kautz and Selman (1991). Notice that model-compactness is only
applicable to skeptical default logic.
Theorem 13 The problem of model checking for skeptical default logic is ‖❀Σp2 complete,
thus skeptical default logic is model-Σp2 complete.
Proof. The proof of membership is straightforward: since model checking for skeptical
default logic is in Σp2 (Liberatore & Schaerf, 1998), it follows that it is also in ‖❀Σ
p
2.
The proof of ‖❀Σp2-hardness is similar to the proof of Σ
p
2-hardness (Liberatore & Schaerf,
1998). The reduction is from the problem ∗∃∀3QBF. Let 〈α, β〉 be an instance of ∗∃∀3QBF,
where β = ∃X∀Y.¬F represents a valid ∃∀3QBF formula, and α is any string.
Let n be the size of the formula F . This implies that the variables in the formula are at
most n. Let Γ = {γ1, . . . , γk} be the set of all the clauses of three literals over this alphabet.
The number of clauses of three literals over an alphabet of n variables is less than O(n3),
thus bounded by a polynomial in n.
We prove that ∃X∀Y.¬F is valid if and only ifM is a model of some extension of 〈W,D〉,
where
W = ∅
D =
⋃
γi∈Γ
{
: ci
ci
,
: ¬ci
¬ci
}
∪
⋃
xi∈X
{
: w ∧ (w → xi)
w → xi
,
: w ∧ (w → ¬xi)
w→ ¬xi
}
∪
{
: w ∧
∧
γi∈Γ ci → γi
w
}
M = {ci | γi ∈ F}
The set {ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} is a set of new variables, one-to-one with the elements of Γ.
Note that W and D only depends on the size n of F , while M depends on F . As a result,
this is a ≤nu−comp reduction.
We now prove that the formula is valid if and only if M is a model of some extension
of the default theory 〈W,D〉. This is similar to an already published proof (Liberatore &
Schaerf, 1998). Consider an evaluation C1 of the variables {ci} and an evaluation X1 of the
variables X. Let D′ be the following set of defaults.
D′ =
⋃
ci∈C1
{
: ci
ci
} ⋃
ci 6∈C1
{
: ¬ci
¬ci
}
∪
⋃
xi∈X1
{
: w ∧ (w → xi)
w → xi
} ⋃
xi¬∈X1
{
: w ∧ (w → ¬xi)
w → ¬xi
}
This set of defaults has been chosen so that the set R of its consequences corresponds
to the sets C1 and X1. Namely, we have:
ci ∈ C1 iff R |= ci
ci 6∈ C1 iff R |= ¬ci
xi ∈ X1 iff R |= w → xi
xi 6∈ X1 iff R |= w → ¬xi
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Now, we prove that the consequences of this set of defaults are an extension of the
default theory if and only if the QBF formula is valid. Since all defaults are semi-normal,
we have to prove that:
1. the set of consequences of D′ is consistent; and
2. no other default is applicable, that is, there is no other default whose precondition is
consistent with R.
Consistency of R follows by construction: assigning ci to true for each ci ∈ C1, etc., we
obtain a model of R.
We have then to prove that no other default is applicable. If ci ∈ C1, the default
:¬ci
¬ci
is not applicable, and vice versa, if ¬ci ∈ C1, then
:ci
ci
is not applicable. Moreover, none
of the defaults :w∧(w→xi)
w→xi
, is applicable if xi 6∈ X1, because in this case w → ¬xi ∈ R, thus
¬w would follow (while w is a justification of the default). A similar statement holds for
:w∧(w→¬xi)
w→¬xi
if xi ∈ X1.
As a result, the only applicable default may be the last one,
:w∧
∧
γi∈Γ
ci→γi
w
(recall that
F is negated). This default is applicable if and only if, for the given evaluation of the ci’s
and xi’s, the set of clauses is satisfiable. This amount to say: “there is an extension in
which the last default is not applicable if and only if the QBF formula is valid”. Now,
if the last default is applicable, then M is not a model of the extension because w is the
consequence of the last default while w 6|=M . The converse also holds: if the last default is
not applicable then M is a model of the default theory.
As a result, the QBF is valid if and only if M is a model of the given default theory.
Theorem 14 The inference problem for skeptical default logic is ‖❀Πp2 complete, thus skep-
tical default logic is thm-Πp2 complete.
Proof. Since inference in skeptical default logic is in Πp2, it is also in ‖❀Π
p
2. ‖❀Π
p
2-hardness
comes from a simple reduction from circumscription. Indeed, the circumscription of a
formula T is equivalent to the conjunction of the extensions of the default theory 〈T,D〉,
where (Etherington, 1987):
D =
⋃{ : ¬xi
¬xi
}
As a result, CIRC(T ) |= Q if and only if Q is implied by 〈T,D〉 under skeptical seman-
tics. Since 〈T,D〉 only depends on T (and not on Q) this is a ≤nu−comp reduction. Since
inference for circumscription is ‖❀Πp2-complete (see Theorem 11), it follows that skeptical
default logic is ‖❀Πp2-hard.
Theorem 15 The inference problem for credulous default logic is ‖❀Σp2 complete, thus
credulous default logic is thm-Σp2 complete.
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Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof for model checking of skeptical default logic.
Indeed, both problems are ‖❀Σp2 complete. Since the problem is in Σ
p
2, as proved by Gottlob
(1992), it is also in ‖❀Σp2. Thus, what we have to prove is that is hard for that class.
We prove that the ∗∃∀3QBF problem can be reduced to the problem of verifying whether
a formula is implied by some extensions of a default theory (that is, inference in credulous
default logic).
Namely, a formula ∀X∃Y.¬F is valid if and only if Q is derived by some extension of
the default theory 〈D,W 〉, where W and D are defined as follows (Γ is the set of all the
clauses of three literals over the alphabet of F , and C is a set of new variables, one-to-one
with Γ).
W = ∅
D =
⋃
ci∈C
{
: ci
ci
,
: ¬ci
¬ci
}
∪
⋃
xi∈X
{
: xi
xi
,
: ¬xi
¬xi
}
∪
{
¬(
∧
ci∈C
ci → γi) :
w
}
Q =
∧
γi∈F
ci ∧
∧
γi 6∈F
¬ci ∧ w
Informally, the proof goes as follows: for each truth evaluation of the variables in C
and X there is a set of defaults which are both justified and consistent. A simple necessary
and sufficient condition for the consequences of this set of defaults to be an extension is the
following. If, in this evaluation, the formula
¬
∧
ci=true
γi
is valid, then the last default is applicable, thus the extension also contains w. The converse
also holds: if the formula is not valid in the evaluation, then the variable w is not in the
extension.
As a result, there exists an extension in which Q holds if and only if there exists an
extension in which each ci is true if and only if γi ∈ F , and such that w also holds. When
the variables ci have the given value, the above formula is equivalent to ¬F . As a result,
such an extension exists if and only if there exists a truth evaluation of the variables X in
which ¬F is valid.
6.4 Belief Revision
Many formalisms for belief revision have been proposed in the literature, here we focus on
two of them: WIDTIO (When In Doubt Throw it Out) and SBR (Skeptical Belief Revision).
LetK be a set of propositional formulae, representing an agent’s knowledge about the world.
When a new formula A is added to K, the problem of the possible inconsistency between K
and A arises. The first step is to define the set of sets of formulae W (K,A) in the following
way:
W (K,A) = {K ′ K ′ is a maximal consistent subset of K ∪ {A} containing A }
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Any set of formulae K ′ ∈ W (K,A) is a maximal choice of formulae in K that are
consistent with A and, therefore, we may retain when incorporating A. The definition of
this set leads to two different revision operators: SBR and WIDTIO.
SBR Skeptical Belief Revision (Fagin, Ullman, & Vardi, 1983; Ginsberg, 1986). The revised
theory is defined as a set of theories: K ∗A
.
= {K ′ | K ′ ∈W (K,A)}. Inference in the
revised theory is defined as inference in each of the theories:
K ∗A ⊢SBR Q iff for all K
′ ∈W (K,A) , we have that K ′ ⊢ Q
The model semantics is defined as:
M |=SBR K ∗ A iff there exists a K
′ ∈W (K,A) such that M |= K ′
WIDTIO When In Doubt Throw It Out (Winslett, 1990). A simpler (but somewhat
drastical) approach is the so-called WIDTIO, where we retain only the formulae of K
that belong to all sets of W (K,A). Thus, inference is defined as:
K ∗ A ⊢WIDTIO Q iff
⋂
W (K,A) ⊢ Q
The model semantics of this formalism is defined as:
M |=WIDTIO K ∗A iff M |=
⋂
W (K,A)
The results on model compactness have been shown by Liberatore and Schaerf (2000).
Here we recall them.
Theorem 16 (Liberatore & Schaerf, 2000, Theorem 11) The problem of model check-
ing for WIDTIO is in ‖❀P, thus WIDTIO is in model-P.
Theorem 17 (Liberatore & Schaerf, 2000, Theorem 5) The problem of model check-
ing for Skeptical Belief Revision is ‖❀coNP-complete, thus Skeptical Belief Revision is
model-coNP-complete.
The results on theorem compactness are quite simple and we provide here the proofs.
Theorem 18 The problem of inference for WIDTIO is ‖❀coNP-complete, thus WIDTIO
is thm-coNP-complete.
Proof. Membership in the class thm-coNP immediately follows from the definition. In fact,
we can rewrite K ∗A into a propositional formula by computing the set W (K,A) and then
constructing their intersection. By construction their intersection has size less than or equal
to the size of K ∪A. As a consequence, after preprocessing, deciding whether a formula Q
follows from K ∗ A is a problem in coNP. Hardness follows from the obvious fact that PL
can be reduced to WIDTIO and PL is thm-coNP-complete (see Theorem 3).
Theorem 19 The problem of inference for Skeptical Belief Revision is ‖❀Πp2-complete,
thus Skeptical Belief Revision is thm-Πp2-complete.
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Time Complexity Space Efficiency
Propositional P model-P
Logic – –
WIDTIO Σp
2
-complete model-P
(Liberatore & Schaerf, 1996) Th. 16
Skeptical coNP-complete model-coNP-complete
Belief Revision (Liberatore & Schaerf, 1996) Th. 17
Circumscription coNP-complete model-coNP-complete
(Cadoli, 1992) Th. 9
GCWA coNP-hard, model-P
in ∆p
2
[logn] Th. 10
(Eiter & Gottlob, 1993)
Skeptical Σp
2
-complete model-Σp
2
-complete
Default Reasoning (Liberatore & Schaerf, 1998) Th. 13
Credulous N/A N/A
Default Reasoning
Stable Model P model-P
Semantics – –
Table 1: Complexity of model checking and Space Efficiency of Model Representations
Proof. Membership follows from the complexity results of Eiter and Gottlob (1992), where
they show that deciding whether K ∗ A ⊢SBR Q is a Π
p
2-complete problem. Hardness
follows easily from Theorem 17. In fact, M |=SBR K ∗A iff K ∗A 6⊢SBR ¬form(M), where
form(M) is the formula that represents the model M . As a consequence, model checking
can be reduced to the complement of inference. Thus inference is ‖❀Πp2-complete.
6.5 Discussion
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results on space efficiency of PKR formalisms and where they
were proved (a dash “–” denotes a folklore result).
First of all, notice that space efficiency is not always related to time complexity. As an
example, we compare in detail WIDTIO and circumscription. From the table it follows that
model checking is harder for WIDTIO than for circumscription, and that inference has the
same complexity in both cases. Nevertheless, since circumscription is thm-Σp2-complete and
WIDTIO is thm-coNP-complete (and thus in thm-Σp2), there exists a poly-size reduction
from WIDTIO to circumscription satisfying theorem preservation. The converse does not
hold: since circumscription is thm-Σp2-complete and WIDTIO is thm-coNP, unless the Poly-
nomial Hierarchy does not collapse there is no theorem-preserving poly-size reduction from
the former formalism to the latter. Hence, circumscription is a more compact formalism
than WIDTIO to represent theorems. Analogous considerations can be done for models.
Intuitively, this is due to the fact that for WIDTIO both model checking and inference
require a lot of work on the revised knowledge base alone—computing the intersection of
24
Space Efficiency of Propositional Knowledge Representation Formalisms
Time Complexity Space Efficiency
Propositional coNP-complete thm-coNP-complete
Logic (Cook, 1971) (Cadoli et al., 1996)
WIDTIO Πp
2
-complete thm-coNP-complete
(Eiter & Gottlob, 1992) & (Nebel, 1998) Th. 18
Skeptical Πp
2
-complete thm-Πp
2
-complete
Belief Revision (Eiter & Gottlob, 1992) Th. 19
Circumscription Πp
2
-complete thm-Πp
2
-complete
(Eiter & Gottlob, 1993) Th. 11
GCWA Πp
2
-complete thm-coNP-complete
(Eiter & Gottlob, 1993) & (Nebel, 1998) Th. 12
Skeptical Πp
2
-complete thm-Πp
2
-complete
Default Reasoning (Gottlob, 1992) Th. 14
Credulous Σp
2
-complete thm-Σp
2
-complete
Default Reasoning (Gottlob, 1992) Th. 15
Stable Model coNP-complete thm-coNP-complete
Semantics (Marek & Truszczyn´ski, 1991) Th. 8
Table 2: Complexity of inference and Space Efficiency of Theorem Representations
all elements of W (K,A). Once this is done, one is left with model checking and inference in
PL. Hence, WIDTIO has the same space efficiency as PL, which is below circumscription.
Figures 3 and 4 contain the same information of Tables 1 and 2, but highlight exist-
ing reductions. Each figure contains two diagrams, the left one showing the existence of
polynomial-time reductions among formalisms, the right one showing the existence of poly-
size reductions. An arrow from a formalism to another denotes that the former can be
reduced to the latter one. We use a bidirectional arrow to denote arrows in both directions
and a dashed box to enclose formalisms that can be reduced one into another. Note that
some formalisms are more appropriate in representing sets of models, while others perform
better on sets of formulae. An interesting relation exists between skeptical default reasoning
and circumscription. While there is no model-preserving poly-size reduction from circum-
scription to skeptical default reasoning (Gogic et al., 1995), a theorem-preserving poly-size
reduction exists, as shown by Theorem 14.
7. Related Work and Conclusions
The idea of comparing the compactness of KR formalisms in representing information is not
novel in AI. It is well known that first-order circumscription can be represented in second-
order logic (Schlipf, 1987). Kolaitis and Papadimitriou (1990) discuss several computational
aspects of circumscription. Among many interesting results they show a reduction from a
restricted form of first-order circumscription into first-order logic. The proposed reduction
will increase the size of the original formula by an exponential factor. It is left as an open
problem to show whether this increase is intrinsic, because of the different compactness
properties of the two formalisms, or there exists a more space-efficient reduction. When a
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first-order language is used, more results on compactness and existence of reductions are
reported by Schlipf (1995).
Khardon and Roth (1996, 1997), and Kautz, Kearns and Selman (1995) propose model-
based representations of a KB in Propositional Logic, and compare it with formula-based
representations. Although their results are significant for comparing representations within
PL, they refer only to this formalism, hence they are not applicable to our comparison be-
tween different PKR formalisms. The same comment applies also to the idea of representing
a KB with an efficient basis by Moses and Tennenholz (1996), since it refers only to one
PKR formalism, namely, PL.
An active area of research studies the connections of the various non-monotonic logics.
In particular, there are several papers discussing the existence of translations that are poly-
nomial in time and satisfy other intuitive requirements such as modularity and faithfulness.
Janhunen (1998), improving on results of Imielinski (1987) and Gottlob (1995), shows that
default logic is the most expressive, among the non-monotonic logics examined, since both
circumscription and autoepistemic logic can be modularly and faithfully embedded in de-
fault logic, but not the other way around. While these results are of interest and help to
fully understand the relation among many knowledge representation formalisms, they are
not directly related to ours. In fact, we allow for translations that are more general than
polynomial time, while in all of the above papers they only consider translations that use
polynomial time and also satisfy additional requirements.
The first result on compactness of representations for a propositional language is pre-
sented, to the best of our knowledge, by Kautz and Selman (1992). They show that, unless
there is a collapse in the polynomial hierarchy, the size of the smallest representation of
the least Horn upper bound of a propositional theory is superpolynomial in the size of the
original theory. These results are also presented in a different form in the more compre-
hensive paper (Selman & Kautz, 1996). The technique used in the proof has been then
used by us and other researchers to prove several other results on the relative complexity of
propositional knowledge representation formalisms (Cadoli et al., 1996, 1997, 1999; Gogic
et al., 1995).
In a recent paper (Cadoli et al., 1996b) we introduced a new complexity measure, i.e.,
compilability. In this paper we have shown how this measure is inherently related to the
succinctness of PKR formalisms. We analyzed PKR formalisms with respect to two succinct-
ness measures: succinctness in representing sets of models and succinctness in representing
sets of theorems.
The main advantage of our framework is the machinery necessary for a formal way of
talking about the relative ability of PKR formalisms to compactly represent information. In
particular, we were able to formalize the intuition that a specific PKR formalism provides
“one of the most compact ways to represent models/theorems” among the PKR formalisms
of a specific class.
In our opinion, the proposed framework improves over the state of the art in two different
aspects:
1. All the proofs presented in the previous papers only compare pairs of PKR for-
malisms, for example propositional circumscription and Propositional Logic (Cadoli
et al., 1997). These results do not allow for a precise classification of the level of
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compactness of the considered formalisms. Rephrasing and adapting these results
in our framework allows us to infer that circumscription is model-coNP-complete and
thm-Πp2-complete. As a consequence, we also have that it is more space-efficient of the
WIDTIO belief revision formalism in representing sets of models or sets of theorems.
2. Using the proposed framework it is now possible to find criteria for adapting existent
polynomial reductions showing C-hardness into reductions that show model-C or thm-
C-hardness, where C is a class in the polynomial hierarchy (Liberatore, 1998).
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